第1回：Daniel M. T. Fessler (Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles)
||"Unpacking the Human Capacity for Culture"
Our species' success in colonizing nearly every ecosystem on the planet is primarily due to our capacity to acquire, use, and further develop information that we acquire from others. Anthropologists have long considered the question of the evolution of what has been termed "the capacity for culture." However, as this phrase suggests, most investigators have
emphasized the development of informationally and evolutionarily implausible generalized learning mechanisms. Evolutionary psychologists have achieved considerable success in identifying domain-specific mental mechanisms. However, with only a few exceptions, they have largely overlooked the problem of culture acquisition. This talk explores the emerging perspective that our species' use of culture depends on the workings of an assortment of special-purpose psychological mechanisms that evolved in order to exploit the enormous adaptive potential of socially transmitted information.
第2回：D. Michael Kuhlman (Department of Psychology, University of Delaware)
||"Own Choice and Expectation of Partner’s Choice in Prisoner’s Dilemma: Does Social Value Orientation Moderate the Effects of Partner’s Apparent Traits, Emotional State and Physical Attractiveness?"
Studies concerned with the influence of partner’s characteristics often present participants with a verbal description of the partner on a small number of traits chosen by the researcher on theoretical grounds (eg, smart/stupid, honest/dishonest). While such research is informative with respect to the chosen traits, it leaves unanswered questions of three general types: (1) What other traits might influence choice and expectation? (2) Are choice and expectation influenced by the same traits? And, (3) Does the participant’s Social Value Orientation (Cooperative, Individualistic, Competitive) relate to the specific type of trait information he/she is most responsive to?
This talk will report the results of ongoing studies by my graduate students (Erin Yeagley and Madeleine Page) that address the above questions. In Yeagley’s work, Participants are shown a set of neutral photographs of 30 partners, and asked to indicate what choice they think they would be likely to make, and what choice they think the partner would be likely to make in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. The photos have been scaled on a number of emotions (anger, disgust, happiness, etc), traits (honest, trustworthy, submissive, etc), and physical attractiveness. Results are analyzed via a Hierarchical Linear Modelling approach in which Level 1 variables are the scaled partner characteristics and sex, and Level 2 variables are the participant’s Sex and Social Value Orientation. We are especially interested in seeing if, as suggested by an earlier (smaller) study, Cooperative and Non-Cooperative participants differ in responsiveness to physical attractiveness.
The work of Madeleine Page to be presented in this talk is an attempted extension of research by Yamagishi and colleagues showing that Japanese males who are cooperative are judged as less physically attractive than non-cooperative Japanese males. In Page’s work, participants rate the physical attractiveness of averaged (morphed) photos, differing in the Social Value Orientation of the students being averaged: Cooperator morphs, Individualistic morphs, and Competitive morphs. Are Cooperator morphs judged less attractive than Individualistic/Competitive ones? Does the difference hold only for males?
In combination, Yeagley’s and Page’s work address an interesting issue. Yeagley’s work shows how Cooperators, Individualists and Competitors respond to physical attractiveness. Page’s work shows whether or not attractiveness is a valid cue with respect to a partner’s predisposition to cooperate. Does attractiveness influence choice and expectation in Prisoner’s Dilemma in a “sensible” way?
第3回：Peter M. Todd (Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University)
場所: 北海道大学人文社会科学総合教育研究棟 W201
|| "Heuristics for mate choice"
Traditional views of rational decision making assume that individuals
use a few powerful mechanisms to solve most of the problems they face.
But given that human and animal minds have evolved to be quick and
just “good enough” in environments where information is often costly
and difficult to obtain, we should instead expect individuals to make
use of an “adaptive toolbox” of simple, fast and frugal heuristics
that make good decisions with limited information processing. These
heuristics typically ignore most of the available information and rely
on only a few important cues. Yet they make choices that are accurate
in their appropriate application domains, achieving ecological
rationality through their fit to particular information structures. We
have been studying such heuristics in important adaptive domains such
as mate choice, where people may use key pieces of information to
guide their choices, including social information gathered from other
individuals (in a phenomenon known as mate copying). Furthermore,
people may use simple aspiration-level or satisficing heuristics to
determine when to stop searching for mates. In this talk I will
describe our general research framework and our specific investigation
of particular heuristics for mate choice, and how we use novel sources
of data such as speed-dating to test for the use of these heuristics.
第4回：Dov Cohen (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
場所: 北海道大学人文社会科学総合教育研究棟 W409
|| "Within- and between-culture variation: Acting and governing virtuously in Honor, Dignity, and Face cultures"
The CuPS (_Cu_lture X _P_erson X _S_ituation) approach attempts to take both culture and individual differences seriously, without treating either as noise and without reducing one to the other. Culture is important because it helps define psychological situations and creates meaningful clusters of behavior according to a particular cultural logic. Individual differences are important, because individuals vary in the extent to which they endorse or reject a cultural syndrome. Further, because different cultures have different cultural logics, individual differences mean something different in each. Central to these studies are concepts of virtue, honor-related violence, and ideas about individual worth as being inalienable vs. socially conferred. We illustrate our argument with two experiments involving participants from Honor, Face, and Dignity cultures. We apply the argument to an analysis of the behavior of political elites, examining the way people from different cultures govern with honor (or not). The studies show that the same "type" of person who was most helpful, honest, and likely to behave with integrity in one culture was the "type" of person least likely to do so in another culture. We discuss how CuPS can provide a rudimentary but integrated approach to understanding both within- and between-culture variation.
第5回：Hackjin Kim (Department of Brain and Cognitive Engineering, Korea University)
場所: 北海道大学人文社会科学総合教育研究棟 W409
|| "Neural Processes Underlying Social Decisions on Faces"
Reading emotional states from others' faces and evaluating people in terms of preference are probably two most fundamental social decisions we make almost every day. Numerous studies from various disciplines indicate that our daily decisions in social settings are influenced by facial impressions of others. Despite the prevalence and potentially harmful consequences of first impression bias, however, the exact neural mechanisms underlying this behavior still remain unclear. In the first half of my talk, I will briefly review my previous studies on the neural circuitries involved in recognizing emotionally ambiguous face stimuli such as surprised faces and in forming first impressions during face preference decisions. I’ll suggest that the subcortical structures such as the amygdala and the nucleus accumbens and the cortical brain structures including the prefrontal cortices play functionally distinctive roles in processing faces, and display significant interactions with each other during social decisions on faces. The second half of my talk will introduce a recent fMRI study from our lab using ultimatum game, in which we investigated the neural mechanisms whereby facial impressions influence social decisions in humans. A pivotal role of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex in integrating information about facial trustworthiness and creating signals biasing decisions during social interactions will be emphasized.
第6回：Sarah F. Brosnan (Department of Psychology & Neuroscience Institute, Georgia State University)
場所: 北海道大学人文社会科学総合教育研究棟 W103
|| "The primate roots of prosocial behavior"|
Humans commonly show behaviors which help others, ranging from relatively cost-free actions, such as letting someone in to traffic, to those which require far more investment, such as donating to charity. Thus an interesting evolutionary question is the degree to which the other primates share these behaviors, and if so, to consider possible functions for prosocial behavior. Although observational data indicates the presence of both low- and high-cost helping behavior in the wild, there has been little experimental evidence until recently. A series of studies over the past several years have investigated whether primates are willing to bring food to members of their social group at minimal cost to themselves (e.g. low-cost helping), and found mixed results. Chimpanzees, who shared a common ancestor with humans only 6 million years ago, fail to behave prosocially in these tests, even in situations which seem to encourage such behavior, such as in reciprocal situations. On the other hand, they do help each other when no foods are involved, and clearly recognize the discrepancy between themselves and others, both when they have more than a partner and when they have less. But this does not indicate that humans are alone in our prosocial tendency; capuchin monkeys and callitrichids do behave prosocially in these situations, providing evidence for which selective pressures which may have led to such behavior in both these primates and humans. Among capuchins, too, prosocial preferences interact with another related social preference, that for equity. We find that inequity does not eliminate prosocial behavior as long as the inequity is not too extreme, indicating that prosocial preferences are robust in these monkeys. However, if too extreme, inequity eliminates prosocial behavior, as well and the ability to successfully cooperate to obtain mutual rewards, indicating that these two social preferences are integrally tied to successful cooperation. Thus, one of the functions of prosocial behavior appears to be to support cooperation, as the partners must take each others’ needs in to account, even if they are dominant, to maintain the benefits from working together.