

題目 Designing the Preemptive Strike Game

氏名 Dora Simunovic

指導教官 山岸俊男

本文 (maximum of 250 words)

A preemptive strike is an attack meant not to provoke war, but to prevent it by destroying the opponent's ability to retaliate. We propose a game where two players decide whether to attack each other within a time frame. A non-attacking player would receive the full monetary reward of 1000 yen. An attacking player would have to sacrifice 10%, while the player who got attacked would lose 50% of their money as well as the ability to counterattack. Therefore, the best option for both players is not to attack. Nevertheless, we predicted a portion would attack out of fear.

A preliminary experiment was conducted in order to verify the game's design and discern a stabile portion of fearful players who would attack. Eighteen students were paired against a computer which never attacked them. One third of them attacked their imaginary opponents. Subsequent interviews and questionnaires showed that their motivation was indeed fear. Participants who had attacked reported thinking that the other player would attack them given the chance. Conversely, players who had not attacked believed that their partners would show trust and cooperate.

The game deliberately created uncertainty, owing to which a significant number of participants attacked in fear, even though this clearly did not lead to the best possible outcome. Therefore, we can say that fear is a powerful motivator for attack, so much so that it surpasses rational, monetary motivations. Powerful, but not overpowering, since the majority cooperated with an unknown "other", maintaining peace. (246 words)