題目： Influence of thinking style on a complex decision-making task with naive participants
This paper presents the results of a study examining the influence of thinking style on a dynamic decision-making task with naive decision makers (university students).
Dynamic decision-making has been defined as ‘control of an environment and/or situation involving dynamism, complexity, opaqueness, and dynamic complexity through a sequence of related decisions, rather than making a single choice that will maximise a return’ (Brehmer, 1992; Diehl & Sterman, 1995; Sterman, 1989). The types of dynamic decision-making domains include: fire fighting, aviation pilot decision-making, medical intensive care, anaesthetic emergencies and defence airborne warning systems (Klein, 1999).
In the dynamic decision-making paradigm, several researchers have found individual differences in performances in dynamic decision-making situations (Gonzalez, Thomas & Vanyukov, 2005). To date, however, little research has focused on the cognitive demands related to dynamic decision-making, and the cognitive abilities required for decision makers to succeed in dynamic environments (Gonzalez et al., 2005).
The main object of the current research was to investigate the relationship between thinking style and performance on a dynamic decision-making task.
Thinking styles were measured by self-reported questionnaires including the Rational - Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) and the Analytic - Holistic Scale (Choi, Koo & Choi, 2007). In the present study we focused on the role of intuition and locus of attention (i.e. content vs. context; parts vs. field):
Intuition has been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical discussion in terms of its role in dynamic and complex decision-making (cf. Eisenhardt, 1999; Kuo, 1998; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005; Simon, 1989; Sojoberg, 2003).
Locus of attention has been identified as a critical component of information processing (cf. 増田et al, in press; Nisbett & Masuda, 2006).
The dynamic decision-making task chosen for this study was that of a wild (bush) fire-fighting scenario. The scenario was created using the Networked Fire Chief Program (Omodei & Wearing, 1995), and is based on similar scenarios that have been used in other studies of dynamic decision making
Overall results showed that:
In terms of intuition, low intuitive thinkers were more likely to perform better on a dynamic decision making task than high intuitive thinkers, especially when there are ‘many’ resources. Although previous studies have talked about the effectiveness of intuition for senior decision makers, it appears that for naive decision makers who do not have enough experience in certain environments, intuition may not be appropriate to adequately deal with the situation.
In terms of the locus of attention, there appears to be no overall difference between people who attend to ‘parts’ versus those who attend to the ‘field’. However participants who are more likely to attend to the ‘parts’ performed much better in a situation where they have ‘many’ resources, than in a situation they have ‘few’ resources. In the low resources condition people who attend to the ‘field’ were more likely to perform better than people who attend to the ‘parts’. These results suggest that it is easier to perform well as a ‘holistic’ thinker when you have only a limited number of ‘objects’ to worry about. When there are too many ‘objects’, it is better to focus your attention on particular ‘objects’ or ‘parts’ of the field.
Although the dynamic decision-making paradigm has a number of theoretical and practical limitations, it has an important conceptual and practical role in helping us understand the nature of dynamic systems, and how humans process information in dealing with such systems. Computer simulated microworlds, such as NFC, are attempts to “bridge the gap between the complexity of field investigations and the rigour of laboratory studies” (Omodei & Wearing, 1995).