Understanding human cooperation by means of social dilemma experiments.
CERSS Colloquium | 2017.6.29

CERSS Colloquium will be held on June 29th.

Date & Time : 2017. 6. 29 (Thu) 14:45-16:15

Location: Hokkaido University, Faculty of Letters, room E304

Participants: Masaki Yuki, Masanori Takezawa, Nobuyuki Takahashi,  Susumu, Ohnuma, Taiki Takahashi, Toshio Yamagisi, and other 11 participants (total 17 participants)

Speaker: Assis. Prof. Marko Jusup (Center of Mathematics for Social Creativity, RIES, Hokkaido University)

Title: Understanding human cooperation by means of social dilemma experiments.

Abstract: Broad cooperation among non-relatives is specific to humans, who often work together to achieve what otherwise would be unattainable goals. Human evolution is therefore based on extensive cooperativeness. However, a full understanding of how and why cooperative societies form is an unresolved scientific challenge. Theoretical research has proposed many cooperation-promoting mechanisms (e.g., direct, indirect, and network reciprocity) and factors (e.g., reward, punishment, hierarchy, etc.), but only a handful of these have been empirically tested. To this end, we conducted a series of social dilemma experiments on cooperation in (i) business-like socio-economic interactions, (ii) natural resource management, and (iii) climate change negotiations. In these experiments, we used the famous Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Game as metaphors for real-life situations in which people decide between personal self interest (selfishness) and common good (altruism). Special attention during the data analysis was given to identifying instances of rational behavior as opposed to cognitive biases that cause deviations from rational expectations. With multiple experimental designs in the pipeline, we believe that the outlook for social dilemma experiments is very promising.
Asuka Murata, Assistant Professor of Center for Experimental Research in Social Sciences
e-mail: asukamurata@lynx.let.hokudai.ac.jp, tel: 011-706-230