

SEPARATING TRUST FROM COOPERATION
IN A DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP:
PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH VARIABLE DEPENDENCE

Toshio Yamagishi, Satoshi Kanazawa, Rie Mashima, and Shigeru Terai

ABSTRACT

We introduce a new experimental game called Prisoner's Dilemma with Variable Dependence (PD/D), which allows players to separate their trust in their exchange partners from their cooperation with them in an ongoing relationship. The game allows researchers to observe the emergence of trust and cooperation separately, and ascertain the causal relationship between them. In 6 studies that use the PD/D design, we find that the players of PD/D consistently achieve very high cooperation rates, sometimes a mean cooperation rate of about 95%, which are higher than the standard PD games sharing similar design features. These findings demonstrate that separating trust from cooperation is critical for building trust relations. They also show that the GRIT strategy help build such relations in the absence of mutual trust.