Motoki Watabe
(Kyoto University)
Cultural difference of resource distribution and opportunity costs
We performed a cross-cultural experiment and a computer simulation to account for how culturally-unique strategy of resource distribution emerges. First, we conducted an ultimatum game experiment in US and Japan with the following two conditions; "anonymous condition" where the distributor never knew her partner's disposition, and "goodness condition" where the distributor knew that the partner is good and honest. Consistent with the past studies, average distribution for self, under the anonymous condition, is about 60% in Japan and about 50% in US. Under the goodness condition, however, it goes down to about 50% in Japan and up to about 60% in US. To account for the emergence of these distributive patterns, we performed a computer simulation to explore what factors determine these distributive patterns in the two cultures. The simulation is an agent-based with genetic algorithms where agents with various distributive strategies play ultimatum games under a natural selection system and well-performing strategies are likely to have their copies whereas poor-performing strategies just disappear. The results suggest that the probability to find new partner (conceptually same as "opportunity costs") plays a major role for emergence of the culturally-unique distributive patterns.